





The mushrooming of international judicial institutions and their entrenchment in various pockets of the international legal landscape particularly since the early 1990s has, it is argued, transformed the international legal order. This boom has brought with it a robust and ever-growing commentary on the concerns, puzzles and opportunities presented by this ascendancy of international law from the bench. The risk of fragmentation and of ‘loss of’ coherence or unity of international law has been chief amongst the anxieties around proliferation (an issue discussed in greater detail in Chapter 11).​[1]​ This anxiety spills over into the perplexities of competing and overlapping jurisdictions,​[2]​ of conflicting jurisprudence and of ill-advised cross-fertilization amongst the various institutions.​[3]​ Yet these institutions are also viewed as bringing opportunities for the achievement of ‘international justice’. Such views about the functions and potential of these judicial bodies range from the traditional and prudent – settlement of disputes – to the ambiguous, (over)ambitious even – for example, peace and justice. Internationals courts and tribunals are increasingly viewed as having a broader societal, perhaps even constitutional, function to fulfil.​[4]​ Commentators have proclaimed a new era for international or global justice, heralded by the restraint of power in international relations and something akin to an international rule of law, and they have pondered the implications for the sovereignty of states. Others have cautioned against overstating the reach and the clout of these institutions. As the publication of studies tracking the development of international courts and tribunals has increased, there has been a noticeable turn in the literature from concern for the conceptual and practical issues raised by such institutions towards understanding and evaluating their effectiveness.​[5]​
	For my contribution to this collection I have been tasked, first, with examining whether international courts and tribunals ‘challenge or reinforce the distribution of international justice’ and, second, with exploring the extent to which international courts and tribunals have achieved ‘the desired transition “from power-based to law-based” international relations’. Both tasks require some thought as to whether there has been a shift in the monopoly held by states, indeed powerful states, on access to international justice. There is no methodologically sound way to pursue this inquiry in a thorough manner within the confines of this chapter. The volume of international courts and tribunals, their distinctiveness, their coverage and their significant outputs is but one obstacle. More important from my perspective, however, is the conceptual opacity of the parameters of my inquiry: ‘international justice’, the ‘distribution of justice’ and the ‘international rule of law’ are all contestable or, at least, complex terms; the Western epistemological leanings of these terms and their hypostasis in the international legal discourse require analysis. The basic aim of my chapter, therefore, is to query both some of the assumptions commonly made and the ambitions sometimes expressed about the potential of international courts and tribunals to bring about change in terms of international justice and to bring power under judicial control.
	International courts and tribunals are somewhat fetishized in the literature. They are burdened with high – often impossible – expectations. Their role, competences and capacity are often overinflated. For one thing, not all international courts and tribunals are tasked with deciding cases that might achieve the lofty ideals we may associate with international justice. In reality, moreover, many of these courts and tribunals are unable to escape – or have no interest in escaping – the politics, the history and the ideology of their creators and caretakers and are, therefore, fraught with institutional limitations and biases. Furthermore, and crucially, the character of international law from which international courts and tribunals stem and with which they engage, is ideologically and historically complex. International law is fundamentally European in origin​[6]​ and, as numerous cosmopolitan thinkers​[7]​ and critical, critical race, Marxist and ‘third world approaches to international law’ (or TWAIL) commentators have demonstrated, international law was structured and remains beset by the colonial encounter and by asymmetrical power relations.​[8]​ Across the regulatory spheres of international law, it is difficult to imagine international courts and tribunals overcoming these deep structural issues in favour of ‘international justice’, however conceptualized. It is not my purpose though to slate international courts and tribunals or the rich and varied literature they generate. Rather, with all of this in mind, I wish to raise questions around what can realistically be expected from these institutions and to plant doubts about the celebratory tenor of the contemporary discussion of international courts and tribunals in the light of international justice concerns. It is necessary to plant these doubts as these discussions often appear divorced from the reality of the international legal project.
	A number of years ago, Brilmayer observed that most optimistic international lawyers ‘are too concerned with showing what international law can do to be interested in making concessions about what it can’t’.​[9]​ Since then, the capabilities of international law, or branches thereof, have been the subject of sustained critique and scepticism.​[10]​ Nevertheless, commentators continue to enunciate their visions of a global constitutional order or a unitary system of international law. International courts and tribunals have become part of this narrative. In this chapter I argue, first, that international courts and tribunals neither simply challenge nor simply reinforce the distribution of international justice, on the basis that even the contention that they have a significant part to play in reviewing or determining this distribution exaggerates their role and their competences. This contention applies both to the procedural side of international justice – that is, the proliferation of courts and tribunals providing more opportunities to access justice – and to the substantive side of international justice – the realization of substantive justice. I argue, second, that law-based international relations are only desirable to the extent that one holds the concept of the international rule of law as meaningful, on the one hand, and that we should be wary of attempts to view law and judicial institutions as separated or separable from the politics and power that establishes them, on the other.
	In section 2, I will provide a brief background to the rise of international courts and tribunals and chart how their growth and their activities are considered in the literature. In section 3, I will tackle the interrelationship between these institutions and the distribution of international justice. In order to do this, I will first consider the problems with the idea of international justice and the idea of ‘the distribution of international justice’ in the light of the concept of global public goods and of the Rawlsian ‘original position’. Thereafter, I will discuss some of the critical literature on international law and international justice, paying particular attention to aspects of cosmopolitan theory and of third world approaches to international law.​[11]​ Cosmopolitan theory and third world approaches to international law, whilst certainly distinguishable in approach, methods and objective, can share a predisposition to deep critique of issues pertaining to global or international justice and international law; unpacking how our international reality is constructed is the objective of third world approaches to international law scholars and this unpacking is also essential to some cosmopolitan theory. Their work accordingly allows for a deconstructive analysis of the international legal project that in turn leads to a more holistic understanding of the extent to which international law and international courts and tribunals are challenged by the idea of the distribution of international justice. Both accounts lead us to an understanding that the existing international legal order is characterized by radical and structural inequality in the distribution of international justice. International courts and tribunals are part of this international legal order and, therefore, from both institutional and political representation perspectives,​[12]​ are not in a position and, at any rate arguably, could not be in a position, to challenge the existing order and bring about social or political change. In section 4, I will try to think through these contentions by examining some of the ideological tenets that infuse the literature on international courts and tribunals. In particular, I will discuss the fragmentation/unity debate and the concept of the ‘international rule of law’ as they pertain to international courts and tribunals.

<a>2. THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
International courts and tribunals are in vogue, it would seem. They may even be in their heyday. The mounting literature on the topic confirms this. In 1997 the Project on International Courts and Tribunals was established to address the ‘challenges and opportunities created by the growing number and role of international courts and tribunals and other dispute settlement bodies that has taken place since the early 1990s’.​[13]​ The Project held a joint symposium with the law school at New York University the following year to consider the proliferation of international courts and tribunals.​[14]​ The participants’ reaction to the growth of international courts and tribunals was emphatic. Romano remarked, for example: ‘[w]hen future international legal scholars look back at international law and organizations at the end of the twentieth century, they probably will refer to the enormous expansion and transformation of the international judiciary as the single most important development of the post-Cold War age’.​[15]​ Commentators have also emphasized the suddenness of the appearance of these new institutions. As part of the symposium, Kingsbury raised concerns about their ‘rapid proliferation … and the increased activity of many of them’.​[16]​ Alford later noted: ‘[t]he past two decades have seen an explosion of new international courts and tribunals’.​[17]​ Likewise Shany, who has examined issues related to their jurisdiction​[18]​ and more recently to their effectiveness,​[19]​ noted the ‘sharp rise in the number of international courts and tribunals’.​[20]​ Webb, writing about coherence and fragmentation among international courts, has described their rise as ‘dramatic’.​[21]​ Alter has placed her recent work on international courts and tribunals in the context of ‘the changing world around us’, commenting that ‘the growing role of judges, both domestic and international, is self-evident’.​[22]​ According to Alter, the ‘new judicial architecture’ is ‘more far-reaching than most people realize’.​[23]​ On the expansion of international courts, Greenwood has written:
<quotation>… the last thirty years have seen an enormous increase in the number of cases brought before international courts and tribunals. Whereas inter-State cases were rare before the 1980s and cases brought against States by individuals or other non-State entities were almost unknown, they are now commonplace and the jurisprudence which they have generated has had a dramatic effect upon many areas of international law.​[24]​</quotation>
	Schabas has predicted a continuation of this ‘rapid growth’. For him, ‘[n]othing would suggest that the growth of international courts and tribunals is a bubble, fragile and ephemeral. Rather, the phenomenon is increasingly well entrenched in the international order. Its continued growth seems likely, as existing institutions increase in size and with the invention of new ones’.​[25]​ Kingsbury, on the other hand, has suggested an alternative future for international courts. He has argued that the creation of new international courts may become less likely due to the ‘growing heterogeneity amongst major powers’. New major powers may, he predicts, veto the establishment of new institutions.​[26]​
	From this snapshot it is possible to deduce, first, that the volume of international courts and tribunals has increased remarkably since the end of the twentieth century; and second that these institutions have, in that time, become embedded in the international legal landscape.

<b>2.1 What are International Courts and Tribunals?
The Project on International Courts and Tribunals and its associates have defined international adjudicative institutions as: (1) international governmental organizations, or bodies and procedures thereof; that (2) ‘hear cases where one or more of the parties is, or could be, a state or international organisation’. These bodies: (3) are composed of independent adjudicators; (4) decide ‘question(s) brought before them on the basis of international law’; (5) follow ‘pre-determined rules of procedure’; and (6) issue ‘binding decisions’.​[27]​ As Schabas has pointed out in relation to international criminal courts, the adjective ‘international’ can be problematic. He observes that it is not easy to provide a concise definition or to provide a formula for identifying an ‘international criminal court’.​[28]​ Besson has also raised this point in relation to international adjudication more generally. She has distinguished between domestic courts applying international law, or even adjudicating in an international fashion, and international courts. The former, irrespective of their engagement with international law, are clearly ‘not international courts in terms of their constitutive law, jurisdiction, and procedures’.​[29]​ The international and the domestic courts are recognisably distinct. It is less easy, however, to summarize and systematize the vast diversity of courts and tribunals at regional and international levels and to pin down what makes them ‘international’.
	Kingsbury has sketched ten major types of international courts and tribunals that he presents loosely in chronological order based on their ‘form and function’.​[30]​ He has listed: inter-governmental claims commissions; ad hoc inter-state arbitration; inter-state arbitration embedded in pre-existing legal institutional structures; standing international courts; international criminal courts; international administrative tribunals; regional human rights courts; regional economic integration courts; the World Trade Organization dispute settlement system; and investment arbitration tribunals. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea did not fit easily into his typology.​[31]​ Romano, Alter and Shany have distinguished between arbitral bodies and judicial bodies (whilst recognizing significant overlap) and categorized international judicial bodies into courts for dispute settlement, human rights courts, courts of regional economic and/or political integration agreements, international criminal courts and tribunals, and international administrative tribunals.​[32]​ Separately, Alter has categorized international courts according to the roles they play in the international political system. The roles she has distinguished are international dispute settlement, international administrative review, international law enforcement and international constitutional review.​[33]​ Alter has readily accepted that this chosen categorization method may be controversial and has pre-empted criticism on the basis that courts may not stick to their delegated role in practice.​[34]​ For the purposes of her study, she mapped out ‘at least twenty-four permanent international courts that have collectively issued over 37,000 binding judgements’.​[35]​
	Romano and Kingsbury have both emphasized the uneven spread of international adjudicative bodies. Romano has observed that ‘while some regions of the globe contain multiple, overlapping, international adjudicative bodies, others have none’, also noting the inconsistency in usage of existing international judicial institutions and the lack of judicialization across certain areas of international relations.​[36]​ These points chime with those of Kingsbury who remarks that the ‘image of judicialization and of a new paradigm can easily be exaggerated: international courts and tribunals are significant on some issues but not others, in some parts of the world much more than others’.​[37]​
	Some elementary points can be made about the word ‘international’ as a descriptor of courts and tribunals. On the one hand ‘international’ is simply, perhaps, a practical description of courts and tribunals that operate beyond national boundaries and/or that are established by, or engage with, international law. On the other hand, the description ‘international’ obfuscates the geographic regionalism and jurisdictional non-internationalism of a number of these institutions. It is important, then, to recognize that the practical denotation can conceal a value laden normative agenda.

<b>2.2 Packaging International Courts and Tribunals: Why So Many, All of a Sudden?
Numerous reasons are provided to account for the quite sudden expansion of international courts and tribunals.​[38]​ These reasons include: the ‘big-bang’​[39]​ and the consequent ‘permissive’ political and economic environment engendered by the end of the Cold War, not to mention the Balkans conflict which followed the break-up of the Soviet Union;​[40]​ ‘disenchantment with governments’;​[41]​ the maturation of international law;​[42]​ a growing commitment to the rule of law in international relations ‘at the expense of power-oriented diplomacy’;​[43]​ the influence of the veteran European system with its successful establishment of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights;​[44]​ and demand, both regional and specialist.​[45]​ The accounts of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals often set the scene by highlighting the precedential periods of growth, those being the Hague peace conferences and the aftermath of the Second World War.​[46]​
	These suggested reasons do provide context for the growth of – and indeed for the (often European-style) form taken by – international courts and tribunals. Yet some of these points raise as many questions as they answer. Some of these reasons seem self-explanatory, but do they really explicate the rapid growth of international courts and tribunals? 
	For example, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the wars in the Balkans certainly provide an obvious backdrop to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. However, whilst this backdrop contextualizes it does not fully explain that tribunal’s establishment. Why in the aftermath of that particular conflict?​[47]​ More generally, the conclusion of the Cold War punctuates the end of socialist ideology as an oppositional barrier and of Soviet bloc resistance to western institutions.​[48]​ Therefore, for some, it marks the beginning of a triumphant and fully international liberalism or liberal internationalism.​[49]​ This apparently provides the permissive environment for the growth of international courts and tribunals – on a wave of international legal liberalism. Yet neither the nature of international legal liberalism – its permissiveness – nor its ramifications are explored in this interpretation. Nor is the connection between the Cold War and a dearth of international court creation really discussed in these generalist works.​[50]​ Commentators from this perspective do not examine the links between the sudden explosion onto the international scene of these new international courts and tribunals and the overlapping rise of neoliberal orthodoxy.​[51]​ In this regard, Sornarajah asserts:
<quotation>The ebbs and flows in ideology have shaped the international law on foreign investment. This is true of the other branches of international law as well. There has been an entrenched aversion to the examination of the law in its ideological and political context. This may itself have been motivated by the desire to ensure that contextual explanation of the real purpose behind the law was cloaked by a cultivated aversion.​[52]​</quotation>
This aversion and these vast omissions in inquiry are clearly not neutral. The interventionism of the liberal international order and its hegemonic protagonists fall entirely outside the frame of this – otherwise assumed to be intuitive, normative and progressive – account of the rise of international law.​[53]​
	Disenchantment with governments as a rationale for the creation of new international courts undermines our understanding of the extent of state involvement in the establishment of these institutions or, even worse, portrays states as contemporaneously only too willing to be policed by international judicial institutions. The idea of the maturation of international law suggests that the establishment of international courts and tribunals was a natural development, a coming of age, following on as it did from the codification of international law, the development of new areas of international cooperation and, with that, the establishment of international organizations and other institutions. The idea of a growing commitment to the international rule of law ties into this story of the development of international law but again omits a structurally interventionist explanation.​[54]​ A symbiosis is generated. More courts mean more rule of law. The rule of law justifies courts; courts justify the rule of law.
	The influence of the European courts is difficult to understand as a reason for the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. Indeed, the grounds for the emulation of the European courts are themselves difficult to pinpoint and explain.​[55]​ It is striking, though, how little anxiety accompanies the addition of this ‘influence of the European approach’ to the general explanation of proliferation. This European influence is, on the one hand, unfortunately reminiscent of past coercive influence and, on the other hand, unambiguously non-international. Beneath this purported reason there exists, once more, an insinuation that feeds into the celebratory narrative – that is, the assumption that the European way is the right way and that, internationally, these are systems that ought to be aspired to. The developed legal architectures of the European Union and Council of Europe are cast as models, or as goals, for other less-developed regional systems or for other regions where legal systems are as yet to emerge.​[56]​ The literature on legal transplants and on the diffusion of law and institutions reminds us, however, that these are not organic, passive processes. Evan famously remarked that ‘[t]he concept of legal transplant has a naturalistic ring to it as though it occurs independent of any human agency. In point of fact, however, elites – legal and non-legal – often act as “culture carriers” or intermediaries between societies involved in a legal transplant’.​[57]​ The European model proposed as part of the explanation of proliferation also generates this naturalist thinking. The demand for regional and specialist courts and tribunals explains the reliance on the European, or any other well-developed, model. Thus, the narrative takes shape and self-perpetuates. The origins of the demand are left to the imagination; the relationship between international courts and international justice fills that imagination.
	International courts and tribunals have become viewed as part of a narrative of an evolutionary achievement of ‘the progressive development of international law’.​[58]​ This celebratory narrative deflects critical inquiry into the political and ideological context of the rise of international courts and tribunals and, crucially, it blunts thinking on the role international courts and tribunals play in safeguarding established power relations and the status quo. Skouteris posits that this attitude towards proliferation as progressive development provides a sense of cohesion to an otherwise heterogeneous literature on international courts and tribunals. He remarks: ‘[t]his cohesion is forged by a certainty, sometimes stated overtly, other times assumed, that the turn to adjudication constitutes a moment of disciplinary progress: an institutional-professional development with benevolent systemic consequences’.​[59]​
	There is something instinctive about viewing international courts and tribunals as marking the apex of progressive development. After all, adjudication is a significant feature of established legal systems.​[60]​ In a way, then, the growth and effective functioning of international courts and tribunals is a tangible response to persistent claims that international law is not really law at all. As Kingsbury puts it:
<quotation>With the surge in the creation of international courts in the 1990s, and the rapid growth in cases in many existing and new international courts, the view that judicialisation might not always be a desirable objective seemed Procrustean – judicialisation was turned from a desideratum into an accomplishment, helping also to assuage Dicyean doubts about the law in international law.​[61]​</quotation>
The existence of international courts and tribunals, of international judges and indeed of international prosecutors, a body of international jurisprudence or case law – all of these elements of international adjudication provide concrete evidence that international law exists and can work in a way that is analogous to any domestic legal system. Similarly, the existence of adjudicatory bodies at the international level capable of reviewing the actions of states compensates for the absence of a central or sovereign international authority.​[62]​ Courts are a central dimension of the rule of law and their founding at the international level – settling disputes by law rather than by force – signifies the existence of an international rule of law.
	The explanations proffered for the existence of international courts and tribunals provide little in the way of concrete explanation. Rather, these reasons appeal to our intuition and knowledge about law and courts (and it follows that our intuition and knowledge are highly conditioned). In so doing, they offer only justification and neat packaging instead. Moreover, and as Skouteris argues, the narrative that accompanies this proliferation of international courts and tribunals ‘compete[s] with and exclude[s]’ alternative accounts.​[63]​

<a>3. INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND ITS DISTRIBUTION
International law and the idea of justice are generally perceived as intimately connected.​[64]​ Yet international relations and the idea of international justice seem curious bedfellows. International relations have generally been viewed as fundamentally at odds with ideas of international justice. From the classical realist perspective, sovereign states, unless it is to their advantage, will not act in the interests of justice in their relations with other states, even if they do cooperate. The international landscape, on this reading, reflects state interests and is characterized by the distribution of power not the distribution of justice.​[65]​ Of course, this is arguably where international organizations and international law step in. Indeed, the United Nations is – ostensibly – designed to militate against the self-interest of states through the maintenance of peace and security, the development of friendly relations amongst states, the achievement of international cooperation in solving ‘problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character’, the promotion of human rights and by providing a centre for harmonization.​[66]​ One of the principles of the United Nations Charter is the peaceful settlement of international disputes ‘in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’.​[67]​ A number of international organizations had existed prior to 1945 and, indeed, numerous institutions have since been established – both linked to and wholly independent of the United Nations – dealing with almost every activity that has an international element.​[68]​ Many of these organizations have been created to fulfil the purposes laid out in article 1 of the United Nations Charter. The vision of those enthralled by this growth of international organizations, the multiplication of international treaties and the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, is of the emergence of a system of international justice tempering the exercise of power in international relations.​[69]​
	Guillaume has pointed out that ‘[t]he role of international justice in our world must neither be exaggerated nor underestimated …’.​[70]​ He was referring to both the potential but also the limitations of the International Court of Justice in resolving disputes that otherwise would lead to the use of force, the potential and limitations of international criminal justice in ‘preventing crime and punishing criminals’ and the potential and limits of the World Trade Organization in settling commercial disputes.​[71]​ For Guillaume, international justice seemed to encompass peace, as well as international criminal justice and dispute settlement of various kinds.​[72]​ The available ideas or concepts of international justice are far from homogeneous and international justice is not well defined. That is, the international law scholarship is replete with references to ‘international justice’ and yet the commentators rarely define what they mean by their object.​[73]​ Is international justice international law? Or international institutions? Or is international justice the product of the deliberations of the international judiciary on international law? Is international justice produced irrespective of the substance of those judgments? Is international justice an umbrella term for various so-called global public goods or a global public good itself? Or is international justice a matter for political theory, philosophy or ethics, entirely separable from international law?
	Analysis of the meaning(s) of international justice is not necessarily prominent within the jurisprudence of international courts and other institutions; in other words, judges do not flesh out its meaning. Arguably, this is the case because these international courts and tribunals have distinct and particular functions to fulfil. Whether those functions are always relevant to, or serve, international justice is debatable. At any rate, it seems at least probable that the term international justice connotes more than ‘decisions of international courts and tribunals’. International justice is arguably about the achievement of ideals rather than mere processes. This does beg the question then, following Guillaume’s assertion: what must we neither exaggerate nor underestimate? What is the content of international justice as produced by the international legal order and this new system of international courts and tribunals?
	International justice is a problematic concept; understanding how it is distributed is doubly perplexing. The word ‘distribution’ means the way in which something is shared out among a group or a number of recipients or spread out over an area. To speak in distributive terms raises the idea that international justice is quantitative, a resource that – rather than having a narrow concentration – can be shared out amongst many or all states in their interactions – and presumably also amongst non-state actors, groups and individuals in the international arena, in their interaction with states and, increasingly, with each other. However, given that international courts and tribunals deal with abstract and often unquantifiable issues – state responsibility; rights and freedoms; individual criminal responsibility; peace; protection of the environment; dispute settlement and so on – then our conception of the distribution of international justice must broaden beyond the connotation of economic or social justice in the term ‘international distributive justice’ to include corrective justice, retributive justice​[74]​ and procedural justice. International justice must surely also entail equitable distribution of access to it as an a priori requirement.​[75]​ The distribution of international justice, with its connotations of production, supply and demand, invokes the language of international or global public goods. Is that concept, though, instructive on the substance and spread of international justice and, particularly, on the relationship of international courts and tribunals to international justice?

<b>3.1 The Distribution of International Justice from the Perspective of Global Public Goods
Global or international public goods have been defined – in this case, broadly​[76]​ – as:
<quotation>… outcomes (or intermediate products) that tend towards universality in the sense that they benefit all countries, population groups and generations. At a minimum, a global public good would meet the following criteria: its benefits extend to more than one group of countries and do not discriminate against any population group or any set of generations, present or future.​[77]​</quotation>
Beyond their benefits having a universal and non-discriminatory reach, global public goods are characterized by (at least partial) non-rivalry and (at least partial) non-excludability. Their non-rivalrous nature means that global public goods can be used by one state, for example, without impacting on their availability to other states. Their non-excludability means that their use is available to all, regardless of involvement in producing these goods.​[78]​ Completely non-rivalrous and non-excludable public goods, it is recognized, are rare; therefore, public goods that do not reach this ideal are termed impure public goods.​[79]​
	International justice is conceivably an outcome global public good or, indeed, may be an umbrella term for various global public goods. It is a greater challenge, however, to discern an agreed account of what the global public good of international justice might constitute, singularly or as a catch-all term – might it include poverty reduction, human rights, international peace and security or climate change mitigation, for example? Who decides? Who prioritizes? International courts and tribunals are perhaps a mechanism for the achievement of international justice; indeed, they may, for that reason, constitute intermediary public goods.​[80]​ Yet international law (and international courts and tribunals), arguably, independently constitutes an outcome global public good.​[81]​ Crucially, international courts and tribunals are constituted by, apply and interpret international law, whether treaty or customary; they are not tasked with applying the language of international justice, or of global public goods for that matter. This is not to deny the obvious judicial law-making capacity exercised by international courts and tribunals.
	The abstract concept of global public goods does not necessarily resolve definitional issues, nor does it lead us to a diagnostic platform whereby we can understand how international courts and tribunals, applying international law, might challenge or reinforce the distribution of international justice. It is not difficult to illustrate the challenge of applying the abstract idea of a global public good in reality. Climate change mitigation, for instance, is frequently cited as an example of a global public good, requiring international cooperation and international policy. In a way climate change mitigation is the ideal global public good. Mitigation has a universal, non-discriminatory reach. The benefits of mitigation are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. In spite of urgency and universality, achieving agreement on climate change mitigation has, however, been laborious. Climate change mitigation is not viewed as a global public good by all in the same way for the same reasons at any cost. In this regard, Bodansky asks: why might people disagree about a desirability of a global public good? First, global public goods may have differential impacts. Consider, for example, climate change mitigation, which many would consider to be a quintessential global public good. Slowing global warming would certainly be good for small island states, which are in danger of being submerged by rising seas, but it would be costly for states that stand to benefit from global warming – for example, because it would provide a longer growing season – or that depend on oil exports for their national income.​[82]​ Indeed, climate change mitigation understood as a global public good might actually clash with international justice understood as a global public good. From the perspective of the least industrialized states or of groups and peoples who have contributed minimally to climate change, yet bear its current brunt, climate change mitigation agreements do not necessarily equate with climate justice – the term du jour.
	The concept of global public goods may usefully frame or structure global institutional policy-making or treaty negotiation. International policy and international treaties are achieved through negotiation, compromise and consensus. However, influence and bargaining power in these processes are not equitable. The concept of global public goods is rooted in the language of utility, costs and benefits. It may have a normative ambition to universality, even international justice, but it requires a regulatory or administrative framework. To an optimist, that framework might entail global democratic deliberation. In reality, however, the institutions, policies and practices that regulate global public goods do (and would) reflect ‘the structure of authority and power’ in those institutions and in policy making.​[83]​ Let’s not also forget that, like international law, the concept of global public goods is already fundamentally European or Western in origin.​[84]​ There is good cause to be wary of a global public policy concept, purportedly global in impact, that originates once more in the global North. De Sousa Santos, writing on the ‘public sphere’ pinpoints the need for vigilance where concepts are concerned:
<quotation>[S]ocial theories produced in the global North are not necessarily universally valid, even when they purport to be general theories … a hermeneutics of suspicion is recommended vis-à-vis such theories, if the epistemological diversity of the world is to be accounted for. At this point, to account for such diversity involves the recognition that the theories produced in the global North are best equipped to account for the social, political and cultural realities of the global North and that in order adequately to account for the realities of the global South other theories must be developed and anchored in other epistemologies – the epistemologies of the South.​[85]​</quotation>
	From a practical perspective, to map international justice onto the concept of global public goods seems to raise as many issues as it resolves. The global public goods concept, it should then be clear, does not resolve the tensions and disconnect between international law and international justice. It does bring into sharp focus the complexity of our subject matter. International justice and international law are not synonymous. The concept of global public goods is more at home in international policy making, perhaps even international treaty making, than in international courts and tribunals, it would seem. Yet we revolve back around to our key problem. How is international policy made? Who decides? The concept of global public goods usefully demonstrates, then, the pitfalls of thinking about international law and international justice as intertwined or, worse, of thinking of international law as a precursor to international justice. More specifically, international courts and tribunals are not necessarily (certainly not primarily) distributors of international justice, given their embeddedness in the prevailing international order, on the one hand, and given their function in interpreting and applying international law, on the other hand. Moreover, the language of global public goods reminds us, as Sornarajah has, that international law and policy and international courts and tribunals have a political and ideological context. The idea of international justice cannot be easily isolated from this context.

<b>3.2 What Might International Justice Mean?
It is trite to point out that justice is a contested concept. The idea of international justice is also, it could go without saying, contested and problematic. International justice, it is sometimes suggested, applies to inter-state justice. Its limitation to the state or horizontal level is used to distinguish the term from global justice, which, it is argued, is broader, is not mediated by the state and, thus, includes justice within and across state borders, for example.​[86]​ This distinction is important but it is also difficult to fully demarcate.​[87]​ Individuals, international organizations and non-state actors, as well as states, are all subjects of international law, as is well known. Numerous sectors of international law are distinctly vertical – that is, not just inter-state – in their structure. By way of example, international criminal law surely falls under the umbrella of international justice. Yet this branch of international law concerns far more than justice in inter-state relations. International criminal law deals with individuals – perpetrators and victims – in addition to addressing the duties of states.​[88]​ The idea of international justice, we must then assume, encompasses at least justice amongst states, justice in the relationships between states and individuals, and it must also include international organizations and non-state actors of various kinds who are subject to international law (notwithstanding weaknesses and enforcement issues). That said, whilst its meaning is broader than ‘between states’, international justice does not suddenly collapse into global justice – given the primacy of the nation state in international law.
	With international justice, we have a tricky and often treacherous concept. It eludes definition or, more aptly, the concept is indeterminate and subjective in practice. Analyses of the concept of justice often start with Rawls’s infamous and influential liberal idea of ‘justice as fairness’.​[89]​ Rawls’s theory espoused that each society agrees its purpose, with members deciding mutually or contractually on their association under fair conditions. Rawls, as is well known, did not view his theory of justice as generally applicable to international relations.​[90]​ Nevertheless when Rawls, in his later (hugely criticized) work,​[91]​ turned his attention to an international or global conception of justice, it echoed, in part, his elaboration of ‘justice as fairness’. Rawls’s ‘law of peoples’, however, was not global or universalist as it was limited to liberal and so-called ‘well-ordered’ non-liberal regimes – ‘decent’ peoples – but did not apply to illiberal, aggressive, ‘outlaw’ states or peoples. Rawls described his idea of ‘the law of peoples’ as ‘realistically utopian’; it is predicated upon the elimination of ‘the great evils of human history’ and the establishment of ‘reasonable and just political and social institutions’.​[92]​ His theory revolved around (a minimum of) seven ‘basic principles of justice of free and democratic peoples’​[93]​ (that do not appear particularly well-founded).​[94]​ The evils or political injustices he listed – unjust war, oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, genocide and mass murder – were all the subject of international treaties. The principles of justice identified by Rawls as required to achieve political justice and just institutions are, thus, fairly familiar. They had already largely been converted into positive international law through treaties on international human rights and international humanitarian and international criminal law. Indeed, these bodies of law arguably already include – and exceed – a Rawlsian account of the content of international justice.
	Rawls did expend some energy detailing one principle that possibly eludes distinct international codification: ‘[p]eoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime’.​[95]​ Rawls argued that this principle could be fulfilled through assistance to ‘burdened societies’ so that those peoples or societies could achieve just institutions.​[96]​ These ideas are, again, arguably aspired to in international agreements such as the preamble to the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization: ‘[r]ecognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development’.​[97]​ They are also reflected in the United Nations Charter and the International Bill of Rights: ‘[w]hereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter … determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’.​[98]​
	Outlaw states, however, fell outside Rawls’s society of states either on account of being illiberal in their dealings with other states or based on their human rights record.​[99]​ These states could be subjected to sanctions and enforcement measures of various kinds. Simpson remarks of Rawls’s ‘law of peoples’ that his view of the international order actually resembles that which exists in the workings of the United Nations Security Council where ostensibly liberal (United States of America, United Kingdom, France) and non-liberal but ‘decent’ (Russia, China) states ‘are accorded high institutional status in actions taken against outlaw states’.​[100]​
	Like international law itself, Rawls’s theory, and his hierarchy of states based on their supposed liberal commitments, conceals the historical, ideological and legal reality of entrenched inequality and entrenched power. His ideas failed to provide any insight into the manner in which the principles of justice and international law that he promoted preserve this entrenched power and inequality. Twining aptly summarizes the shortcomings of Rawls’s theory of international or global justice:
<quotation>From a global perspective, it is bizarre to find a purportedly liberal theory of justice that rejects any principle of distribution, treats an out-dated conception of public international law as satisfactorily representing principles of justice in the global arena, and says almost nothing about radical poverty, the environment, increasing inequalities, American hegemony … let alone about transitional justice or the common heritage of mankind or distribution or reparations or other issues that are now high on the global agenda.​[101]​</quotation>
	Space does not allow for a thorough appraisal of the many meanings that have accompanied ‘justice’ and ‘international justice’ through the ages. Rawls’s account does, however, provide a useful instrument to explore the relationship between the meaning and the universality of international justice. Applied to international justice via international law, Rawls’s theory illuminates, and not in the way he intended, the chasm between international law as codified and the international legal order as lived.​[102]​ Rawls’s theory justifies the civilizing mission and neglects histories and accounts that are non-hegemonic. In this way his theory reflects the development of international law: ‘[i]t was only because of colonialism that international law became universal; and the dynamic of difference, the civilising mission, that produced this result, continues into the present’.​[103]​ Like the concept of global public goods, Rawls’s theory does not lead us beyond the status quo; it certainly does not help us to understand the structural inequality or injustice of the status quo. With all of this in mind, it is perhaps more useful to examine critiques of international law from an ‘international justice’ perspective than to attempt to reach a satisfactory, even if illusory, definition.

<b>3.3 The State of International Justice: Cosmopolitanism and Third World Approaches to International Law
To what extent do international courts and tribunals challenge or reinforce the distribution of international justice? In order to address that question, it is first necessary to have some understanding or sense of the state of international justice as ‘distributed’ in our contemporary world. What exactly is it that international courts and tribunals are supposed to either challenge or reinforce? This is a taxing discussion that must necessarily proceed at a certain level of abstraction.
	Cosmopolitanism – another Western construct​[104]​ – might seem an odd rejoinder to the inadequacy of global public goods or Rawlsian ideas of justice. Cosmopolitan theory is unquestionably normative; it focuses on the individual and the individual’s status in the global community. Consequently, as McAuliffe has written, the ‘cosmopolitan conception of the world in which humans are the subjects of law conflicts with the traditional, State-centric Grotian tradition of the international community in which States are the exclusive (or almost exclusive) actors on the international scene’.​[105]​ Legal cosmopolitan theory imagines a global political order in which all persons have ‘equivalent rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic’.​[106]​ Individuals, and not communities or states, therefore, are central to cosmopolitan theory, whether moral or legal in orientation, and it applies to all persons equally with global, unbounded, force.​[107]​ In centralizing the individual, cosmopolitan legality thus departs from the state-centric international legal order.​[108]​
	Pogge, both a student and a critic of Rawls, is renowned for his ideas on global justice from a cosmopolitan perspective. In his work, Pogge has focused heavily on global economic injustice, on global poverty, on the power of affluent states and the biases of global financial institutions that sustain radical poverty. Pogge has captured the magnitude of the international justice distribution imbalance:
<quotation>Each day, some 50,000 human beings – mostly children, mostly female, and mostly people of colour – die from starvation, diarrhoea, pneumonia, tuberculosis, malaria, measles, perinatal conditions and other poverty-related causes … I believe that most of this annual death toll and of the much larger poverty problem it epitomizes are avoidable through minor modifications in the global order that would entail at most slight reductions in the incomes of the affluent. Such reforms have been blocked by the governments of the affluent countries, which are ruthlessly advancing their own interests and those of their corporations and citizens, designing and imposing a global institutional order that, continually and foreseeably, produces vast excesses of severe poverty and premature poverty deaths.​[109]​</quotation>
	Against this existing international legal order which is upheld by the concentration of sovereignty at state level and which sustains inequality, Pogge has proposed a pluralist global institutional scheme in which sovereignty is widely dispersed both above and below the level of the state and in which individuals determine their political participation. This scheme is, therefore, capable of expressing the needs of individuals, communities and peoples.​[110]​
	The cosmopolitan imagination is common in international legal scholarship and practice. Koller argues that there is ‘a deep-rooted faith among all international lawyers in the progressive development of international law’; he further opines that this ‘“progressive development” embodies the normative idea that the development of the law will lead progressively towards the establishment of first an international community and then a cosmopolitan community (a community in which all individuals are accorded equal moral status, independent of any national borders)’.​[111]​ For this ‘school’ of cosmopolitan international lawyers (who are arguably most prominent in international human rights law and international criminal law), the principle of non-intervention underpinning United Nations inter-state relations is, in certain respects, outdated and incompatible with the goals of securing rights, punishing perpetrators and so on. This version of cosmopolitanism, driven by faith in supranational institutions, particularly supranational judiciaries, and in liberal international legality, is, in effect, the liberal democratic state writ or ‘imagined’ large. Underpinned by a suspicion of state political power, legal cosmopolitan theory perversely (perhaps rather optimistically or naively) wishes to, nevertheless, replicate the model on a global scale.​[112]​ It is not driven by a critique of the existing order or of international institutions. Ultimately, for this reason, it defends the status quo.​[113]​
	It is wrong, however, to subsume cosmopolitan theorists like Pogge into, or to confuse them with, this cosmopolitan international legal community. Pogge’s ambitions do not rest on a supranational international judiciary. He understands that international institutions are produced by sovereign states and are not, therefore, a consequence of the conquest of state sovereignty. Pogge has used the idea of ‘moral human rights’ to critique existing international law and legal rights.​[114]​ He has argued that ‘current global institutional arrangements as codified in international law constitute a collective human rights violation of enormous proportions to which most of the world’s affluent are making uncompensated contributions’.​[115]​ Pogge has identified in the existing international economic order, in particular, profound structural inequality that favours affluent states, their citizens and corporations. This order produces severe poverty. Against arguments that resist this causal view, he has argued that the structure of the international economic order rests on a history of colonialism and enslavement that produced unrecoverable levels of economic equality, on consequent vast economic inequality in expertise, competence and bargaining power, and on subsequent asymmetries in rules on investment, trade and so on.​[116]​ Pogge has called for reform of this international institutional order through the imposition of financial costs on affluent countries, to give but one example. There are contradictions to Pogge and to the reformist and cosmopolitan ambitions his work espouses: institutional reform of existing institutions sits uneasily alongside his contention that the concentration of sovereignty at the state level is no longer defensible – the former would arguably require the negation of his latter contention to come into effect, for example. Whether one believes in the feasibility of institutional reforms or of cosmopolitan pluralism, the critique that underlies these aspirations is, nevertheless, instructive.
	The ‘subaltern cosmopolitanism’ examined and espoused by de Sousa Santos provides an accompaniment to this critique; it also helps to clarify seeming contradictions.​[117]​ Subaltern cosmopolitan legality describes (nascent or emergent) bottom-up solidarity political practices which resist and subvert hegemonic institutions and ideology.​[118]​ It complements global counter-hegemonic resistance; together these strategies are pursued by and are inclusive of those who are marginalized and excluded from global politics and legality – those essentially at the sharp end of global inequality.​[119]​ Subaltern cosmopolitan legality demonstrates the myopia of viewing international justice as the recordings and transactions of the international judicial ledger. This is myopic as it ignores the crucial players – whether weaker states, transnational civil society, communities or individuals – and the crucial politics in struggles for international justice. International justice, understood from this perspective, is not a decision, a value, an outcome or a service, it is a struggle and it is political. The reconstruction of international law through the subaltern cosmopolitan strategy is neglected in mainstream international legal literature,​[120]​ but it is a goal also shared by third world approaches to international law scholars.
	Third world approaches to international law scholars examine the ‘history, structure and process of international law and institutions from the standpoint of the peoples of the third world,​[121]​ in particular its poor and marginal sections’.​[122]​ Amongst other strategies, these scholars examine the continuities and discontinuities in the development of international law with a view to understanding how global injustice was facilitated and how it is sustained.​[123]​ Others focus on de-elitizing international law in order to make visible (or heard) resistance, social movements and subaltern voices.​[124]​ Third world approaches to international law scholarship is at the intersection of critical resistance and reform.​[125]​ This means that those scholars associated with third world approaches to international law​[126]​ deconstruct the historical and structural asymmetries of international law but they also seek to transform the international order, with the aim of improving the lot of marginalized states, groups and individuals. Third world approaches to international law, overall, provide a searing appraisal of the landscape of international justice. In this regard, Chimni has written: ‘[a]t present, international law is unable to seriously respond to the expectations of a vast majority of the people of the third world both in terms of maintaining global order and, despite its exponential growth in recent years, promoting global justice’.​[127]​ This is due, he has argued, both to the unlawful use of force against third world states and peoples and to global poverty and inequality.​[128]​ Falk, Rajagopal and Stevens have argued that, despite the proliferation of positive international law over the last 50 years, it is not clear that this has ‘translated into greater well-being for the peoples and countries in the South’.​[129]​ They argue that the ‘production of international law cannot automatically be assumed to be in the interest of the South, or to produce a legal system that is minimally just’.​[130]​
	The third world approaches to international law critique powerfully demonstrates the challenge faced by the international justice project once the deep inequities of international law are grasped. It also illuminates the shortfalls of conventional thinking as regards the progressive potential of the judicialization project. On the other hand, it could be argued that the reformist claims of the critique do raise the possibility for international courts and tribunals to play a role in challenging international injustice. On this point, however, it is not plain sailing: on the one hand, the emancipatory potential of international law envisaged by third world approaches to international law is doubted;​[131]​ on the other hand, international courts and tribunals are not necessarily either capable of, or apt for, challenging the status quo.
	Concerning the state of international justice, subaltern cosmopolitan legality and third world approaches to international law provide alternate analytical frameworks to the liberal, progressive or cosmopolitan legal literature. These frameworks or critiques redirect our focus. First, rather than viewing international courts and tribunals as international justice mediators or distributors, these institutions become comprehensible as part of a problematic liberal legal paradigm. Second, we are encouraged to direct our attention to the actors who are central to real struggles for international justice, whether they use international courts and tribunals as a means or not. This second point does not aim to dismiss the importance or the potential of international courts and tribunals; rather, the aim is to encourage a shift of perspective from a top-down to a bottom-up appreciation of the struggles for international justice.​[132]​ This refocus shows too that there is a wide gap between the international legal project, in which international courts and tribunals play an increasingly significant role, and the quest for international justice. The literature has not fully grasped the extent of this gap, as evidenced by the sustained preoccupation with the unity of international law, the international rule of law and the taming of state sovereignty.

<a>4. AN INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY: SOME PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS
Within the literature on the international judiciary there are a number of overlapping presuppositions and underlying ideological tenets that merit discussion. Kingsbury points out that the critique in this area is limited.​[133]​ The literature on international courts and tribunals gives a fairly glowing account of their development. This is not to say there are no criticisms or detractors amongst the prominent scholars writing about these new institutions. Shortcomings are scrutinized. By way of example, jurisdictional gaps and enforcement weaknesses have been identified as blind spots of the new international judicial landscape.​[134]​ The uneven spread of international judicialization has also not gone unnoticed. At a generalist level, however, the critique, with few exceptions,​[135]​ has not drilled deep.

<b>4.1 The Unity of International Courts and Tribunals
Discussions of international courts and tribunals often rely, methodologically or normatively, on an assumption that there is an international legal system or order, of which international courts and tribunals form a(n increasingly significant) part. The view of international law as a system or order – and as desirably a unitary system or order – is particularly pronounced in the fragmentation and constitutionalism literature. The contemporary and ongoing fragmentation debate began in earnest in the late 1990s with a number of International Court of Justice judges expressing their angst at the dangers of fragmentation of international law as a consequence of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals.​[136]​ These fears of fragmentation rest on the dual assumption that there was/is an unfragmented or unitary system of international law in the first place and that such a system was/is desirable.​[137]​ According to this view, the inevitable solution to the problem of fragmentation must therefore be strategies for unity. As Koskenniemi and Leino wrote in 2002, ‘today, confronted by the experience of fragmentation, international lawyers suggest combating it by the technique of a single, coherent, public law driven system of control’.​[138]​ 
	The international courts and tribunals literature, which forms a significant part of the fragmentation discussion,​[139]​ is often infused by this imagination of coherence and of unity. Webb, for example, has explicitly acknowledged that her study is grounded on the assumption that ‘there is an international legal system, albeit one that is diffuse and decentralised’ and she specifies that ‘incoherence or judicial fragmentation is undesirable’.​[140]​ Webb has also explicitly linked the international system, international courts, coherence and the delivery of justice: ‘[a]n integrated approach is essential to the stability of the fragile international legal system and the justice it is expected to dispense’.​[141]​ Her call to ‘unity’ recalls the words of former International Court of Justice Judge Guillaume:
<quotation>International law is our common heritage from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It must obviously be geared to meet the needs of our modern world. It must also take into account the problems arising in specific regions or in specific fields. But it must not be broken up in such a way as to jeopardise its unity.​[142]​</quotation>
Shany, by putting the word ‘system’ in inverted commas, has clearly suggested that this word is not quite right, yet he has depicted the ‘international law “system”’ through the domestic analogy of three branches: executive, legislative and judicial. He has remarked: ‘… given the relative weakness of the other branches of the international law “system,” the legislative and executive branches, one may view international courts and tribunals as the lynchpin of an emerging rule-based international order’.​[143]​ He has also put forward, with cautious optimism, the idea that the proliferation and strengthening of international courts and tribunals and the increased invocation of international law in domestic courts has generated a ‘stronger (though still fragmented) international judiciary, and a qualitative change in the configuration of the field of international dispute settlement’.​[144]​ That said, Shany has also recognized forthrightly the value of legal pluralism,​[145]​ and the reality of institutional priorities underpinning fragmentation.​[146]​ His most recent writing is imbued with cautiousness towards a singular approach to understanding and meeting the challenge of fragmentation in international courts and tribunals.​[147]​ Nevertheless, Shany intimates systemic and unity-oriented thinking.​[148]​ In this regard, he has expressed concern that unaddressed issues risk jeopardizing the ‘project’ of international judicialization:
<quotation>The unco-ordinated growth of international courts is likely to continue to raise increasingly difficult questions of procedural co-ordination and normative fragmentation. In a similar vein, the lack of a comprehensive approach to dispute settlement at the international level and the weakness of the existing institutional enforcement structures continue to give rise to issues concerning the efficacy and legitimacy of international adjudication.​[149]​</quotation>
These remarks associate coordination and comprehensiveness in approaches to international adjudication with efficiency and legitimacy. However they also give a sense of international adjudication as part of a plan; one that if not already predetermined ought to be shaped and ordered.
	The point here is not to pick on scholars whose work digs deeply into the law and practices of international courts and tribunals and which, consequently, enriches our understanding of the functioning and future of these institutions. After all, it is hardly uncommon to seek both to better understand or to advance international law and to see international institutions as players in that knowledge and advancement. We encounter with this narrative a ‘vision’ of international courts and tribunals as contributing to the constitution of the international order, and this vision contrasts starkly and controversially with the traditional view of international law as governing relations amongst states on the basis of state consent.​[150]​ This constitutional vision wishes to bring order to the messy disorder of an international legal conception of sovereign equality that is in constant collision with the reality of sovereign inequality.​[151]​ We find ourselves, with some of this literature, faced with what Koskenniemi called the ‘project of gentle civilizing’.​[152]​ This, for Koskenniemi, was both a legal and a political project. In a similar way to how we find the rationale for the growth of international courts and tribunals packaged, underlying this scholarship is a belief in the progressiveness of international law. This perspective excludes alternate perceptions and experiences of international law. An alternate account might demonstrate that international law is, in fact, far from fragmented. As Okafor puts it, ‘the international legal order has continued to cohere around its tendency to become preoccupied with soothing the fears, furthering the interests and maintaining the global privilege of the far more powerful first world states’.​[153]​ It is not easy to see why a coherent, unified international law might offer a path to justice. It could just as easily be argued that a diverse, fragmented and uncoordinated international law might offer better avenues for access, participation, influence and, perhaps even, international justice.

<b>4.2 The International Rule of Law and the Sovereign State
The rule of law is a contested ideal;​[154]​ it is also an elusive concept. Stripped to its Diceyan core, the concept essentially presumes the supremacy of ordinary (accessible, stable) law over arbitrary power, ​[155]​ and equality before the law within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.​[156]​ Dicey derived his formulation from his interpretation of the nineteenth-century English constitution. The core ideas he identified continue to prevail in the literature; although, as Beaulac has noted, ‘[t]his does not mean … that there is any kind of consensus or agreement on the meaning and scope of the rule of law’.​[157]​ In terms of scope, as is well known, there are thin (narrow, formal) and thick (wide, substantive) versions of the rule of law; at the thicker end of the spectrum, the rule of law guarantees the protection of substantive rights. The concept of the rule of law is ubiquitous, increasingly so in international law.​[158]​ Definitions of the rule of law applicable in the domestic arena do not transfer neatly to the international plane, however. On the contrary, as Hurd points out, ‘the international rule of law cannot be inferred from the domestic version’.​[159]​ 
	The rise of international courts and tribunals is posited by some as evidence of a shift from power- to law-based international relations. This shift is captured in the language of global governance, in the language of constitutionalism, and in the phrases ‘judicialization of international relations’​[160]​ and the international or indeed ‘global rule of law’.​[161]​ In this regard, for example, Romano has stated:
<quotation>… international jurisdictions not only settle disputes but also apply international law. They transform abstract norms into cogent and binding reality, and by doing so they are promoting justice. Framed in this manner, international jurisdictions become essential tools for the building of the international legal system and the furtherance of the international rule of law. That is a mission that admittedly escapes the narrow ambit of a dispute.​[162]​</quotation>
Less optimistically, he also observes that ‘[a]s long as the world is divided into sovereign states, judicialization that is truly universal, complete and homogenous across regions and subjects will never happen. The international judicial system will remain incomplete and fragmented, reflecting the wide and uneven distribution of power’.​[163]​ Alter has described the growth of international courts as having resulted in the ‘judicialization of international relations and diminishing government control over how international legal agreements are understood domestically and internationally’.​[164]​ Shany has observed the displacement of ‘the more power-based international order that previously reigned in international relations’ by a rule-based international order.​[165]​ 
	Von Bogdandy and Venzke view international courts not only as international law actors but as actors of ‘global governance’. Thus, they argue, international adjudication ‘not only impacts the international relationship between states, but also contexts within states, even if international decisions do not enjoy direct effect’.​[166]​ However, with respect to their operation, they also argue that ‘[e]ven if international courts do not protect all interests equally and sometimes even entrench asymmetries’, this may be offset by ‘their overall role in the juridification of international relations [which] is uncontestable. This juridification has a fundamentally pacifying effect on international relations, which in turn by and large serves domestic democracy’.​[167]​ For them, as is the case for Shany, the international judiciary anchors the international legal order. Their argument recalls Kelsen’s advocacy for an international court with compulsory jurisdiction. Kelsen made room for a strong, law-making judicial function, where positive law might be adapted to ‘their [the judges’] idea of justice’.​[168]​ A strong international court was for Kelsen compatible with the principle of sovereign equality and, thus, an international court was desirably the main organ of the international community.​[169]​
	These accounts suggest a multitude of broad contributions by the international judiciary from the promotion of justice to the taming of power by law. The faith in juridification suggests a loss of faith in the international politics from which international law and international courts and tribunals stem. The effects and the supposed benefits of this juristocracy are always cast in abstract terms with little attention paid to the manner in which international courts and tribunals preserve the international legal order in the interests of the hegemonic and the affluent.​[170]​ Moreover, the invocation of the rule of law or judicialization at the international level is rarely accompanied by a detailed explanation. The inter-state nature of international law, the absence of a central international authority, the largely consent-based nature of international law, judicial law making or creativity and the principle of sovereign equality (meaning political independence under conditions of formal equality) underpinning the international legal order all present puzzles – not necessarily unsolvable ones – for the idea of the international rule of law.
	The international rule of law seems to imply a depoliticized world order of legal sovereign equality, perhaps also with universal respect for human rights.​[171]​ This view wills away the deeply ingrained asymmetries which dictate international law and international relations. Even when these asymmetries are accepted, it is posited as a sacrifice worth making for the sanctity of the judicialization project.

<a>5. CONCLUSION
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